Factors of people-centric security climate: conceptual model and
  exploratory study in Vietnam by Dang-Pham, Duy et al.
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Dang-Pham, Pittayachawan, and Bruno 
2015, University of South Australia, Adelaide  People-centric security climate: model and exploratory study  
 
 
 
Factors of people-centric security climate: conceptual 
model and exploratory study in Vietnam 
Duy Dang-Pham 
School of Business IT and Logistics 
RMIT University 
Melbourne, Australia 
Email: duy.dang@rmit.edu.au 
Siddhi Pittayachawan 
School of Business IT and Logistics 
RMIT University 
Melbourne, Australia 
Email: siddhi.pittayachawan@rmit.edu.au 
Vince Bruno 
School of Business IT and Logistics 
RMIT University 
Melbourne, Australia 
Email: vince.bruno@rmit.edu.au 
Abstract 
There is an increasing focus on the persuasive approach to develop a people-centric security climate 
where employees are aware of the priority of security and perform conscious security behaviour 
proactively. Employees can evaluate the priority of security as they observe and interact with the 
security features that constitute the security climate of the workplace. We examined the fundamental 
challenge that not every employee could recognise those features. In this multi-stage research, we 
adopted the theoretical lens of symbolic interactionism to advance a conceptual model which explains 
the relationship between organisation’s social networks and the formation of information security 
climate. A descriptive case study in Vietnam was then conducted to refine the proposed model. The 
findings validated and extended the dimensions of information security climate, as well as identified 
the relevant organisation’s social networks (i.e. information, affect, and power) that lead to its 
formation. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the past decades, a large amount of theoretical and empirical researches have contributed 
findings about the users’ important role in ensuring organisational information security. These 
studies investigated perceptions of the environmental cues that would result in security behaviours 
that are desired (e.g. Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan 2015; Herath and Rao 2009; Siponen et al. 
2014) or undesired by the organisations (e.g. D’Arcy and Devaraj 2012; Dang 2014; Guo and Yuan 
2012). Even though important factors that motivate security practices have been determined, there 
lacks investigations of how to exploit these factors to develop and maintain an information security 
environment. To answer this question, we investigate how information security perceptions could be 
disseminated amongst the employees, which subsequently form an information security workplace. 
From the industry perspective, the development of people-centric security workplaces was mentioned 
as an emerging trend (Gartner 2015). People-centric security workplaces focus on building a group 
culture that fosters acceptable security behaviours, as well as the individual’s perceptions of 
accountability and responsibility, by addressing their interrelated actions in the workplace’s social 
networks (Gartner 2015). Academics have also examined security interactions amongst individuals 
such as delegation of responsibility and co-participation in performing security behaviours 
(Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010; Dourish et al. 2004; Thomson et al. 2006). Most recently, Dang-
Pham et al. (2014) extended these arguments by highlighting the interactions among human and non-
human entities (e.g. policy). These interactions describe how the employees could have access to and 
utilise the resources in their workplace for making security decisions. Furthermore, Dang-Pham et al. 
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(2014) suggested future studies to employ social network analysis techniques to investigate those 
interactions and their contributing effects towards information security behaviours. 
As we are interested in studying the development of a people-centric security workplace, this leads to 
the investigation of a relevant construct named information security climate. Information security 
climate has been conceptualised inconsistently by prior researches (Dang-Pham et al. 2015). These 
researchers also argued that there has been little effort to link information security climate with the 
workplace’s social networks. As a result, the goals and implications of this study are twofold. First, we 
discuss the interactionist perspective in the context of information security climate and forward a 
conceptual model with hypotheses that can be tested with social network analysis techniques. Second, 
we present key findings from an exploratory case study that identified the interactions that 
disseminate information security perceptions in ISO 27001-certified companies in Vietnam. This 
exploratory study provides empirical evidences to refine our proposed conceptual model. Additionally, 
the case study’s findings contribute to the current body of knowledge in which information security 
researches in non-Western contexts are lacking (Crossler et al. 2013). In summary, this is a multi-
stage research, and it aims to answer the following questions: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between organisational networks and perceptions of information 
security climate; and 
RQ2: What are the organisational networks that influence perceptions of information security 
climate, as suggested by information security professionals in Vietnam? 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Conceptualising information security climate (ISC) 
The concept of information security climate (ISC) originated from one of the earliest studies by Chan 
et al. (2005), who conceptualised ISC perception as reflecting the perceived organisational concerns 
about information security. Subsequent ISC researches continued to use parts of Chan et al.'s (2005) 
model and test ISC models differently (Goo et al. 2014; Jaafar and Ajis 2013). Dang-Pham et al. (2015) 
suggested that ISC construct may have four dimensions, namely (1) leadership, (2) job & role, (3) 
workgroup, and (4) organisational systems. Their proposed dimensions were influenced by the 
seminal works of James and colleagues (James et al. 2008; Jones and James 1979), that defined 
organisational climate as the shared employees’ cognitive valuations of the workplace’s events that are 
significantly meaningful to them. These dimensions are related to the personal values system, which 
James et al. (2008) argue that their factors (e.g. role ambiguity of “job & role” dimension) match with 
a person’s desires (e.g. desire for clarity) and impact their workplace well being. As a result, employees 
would be more aware of these factors in the workplace than the others and make sense of them, and 
organisational climate could be measured by aggregating individuals’ climate perceptions (James et 
al. 2008).  
Another important area that could contribute to the conceptualisation of ISC is safety climate which 
shares many common features (Chan et al. 2005). Both of these concepts refer to the climates that 
focus on a specific facet of an organisation (i.e. information security and safety) (Schneider et al. 
2013). Moreover, information security and safety are strategic goals that require the employees’ 
compliance yet often conflict with competing work demands (Chan et al. 2005). Similar to James et 
al.'s (2008) discussion, safety climate was defined as the shared perceptions of the safety’s policies, 
practices, and procedures that are rewarded and supported (Zohar 2013). While there is no consensus 
regarding safety climate’s dimensionality, supervisor and co-workers’ safety practices were found to 
appear repeatedly in safety climate questionnaires and could inform the priority of safety practices 
(Zohar 2013). Similarly, prior ISC researches (Chan et al. 2005; Dang-Pham et al. 2015; Goo et al. 
2014; Jaafar and Ajis 2013) measured direct supervisor and co-workers’ practices in their models even 
though the factorial structures were different. Given this similarity, we support conceptualising ISC as 
a higher-order, reflective construct that consists of these two dimensions. We also define ISC as the 
perceptions of information security policy, practices, and procedures that are supported and expected 
in the workplace. Ultimately, ISC informs the priority of information security in the workplace. 
2.2 The formation of information security climate 
The formation of organisational climates can be analysed by adopting the theoretical lens of the 
interactionist perspective (Schneider and Reichers 1983). This perspective draws on symbolic 
interactionism to explain how organisational climates could be socially constructed as the employees 
interact with their workgroup (Ashforth 1985). This explanation fits our conceptualisation of ISC 
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which reflects the observed practices of co-workers and supervisors. Ashforth (1985) also discussed 
the important role of informational and normative influences in the formation of organisational 
climates. He explained that informational influence provides the information to reduce the ambiguity 
and uncertainty in the workplace, especially via social comparison and conformity mechanisms. 
Normative social influence offers prescribed behaviours and beliefs that regulate climate by removing 
disagreements. 
These social influences provide a theoretical ground for identifying the relevant interactions that 
affect security beliefs and behaviours. We reviewed literatures about social influences and sense 
making in workplace, especially the studies that employed social network analysis techniques. Social 
network analysis techniques are particularly useful in this context by providing the criteria to 
determine the most relevant interactions amongst a plethora of potential ones (Dang-Pham et al. 
2014, 2015). Interactions or networks can be determined based on their natures and transactional 
contents. On the one hand, researches have been examining the effects of networks whose natures are 
expressive (e.g. friendship) and instrumental (e.g. seek/give advice) on individual’s perceptions (Sykes 
et al. 2009). On the other hand, Tichy et al. (1979) suggested four types of exchanged contents, 
including affect (e.g. liking), influence or power, information, and goods or services.  
The interactionist perspective sees organisational climates as formed by informational and normative 
social influences that reduce ambiguity and uncertainty in the workplace. By defining ambiguity as a 
situation when an individual is confused by too many interpretations and uncertainty refers to the 
absence of information, Saint-Charles and Mongeau (2009) found that employees tend to seek experts 
(i.e. instrumental network) for reducing uncertainty while clarifying ambiguity with friends (i.e. 
expressive network). When information security policies are announced, employees would face both 
ambiguity (e.g. trying to interpret the priority of information security) and uncertainty (e.g. being 
required technical knowledge to perform secure practices) (Dang-Pham et al. 2015). In addition, the 
concept of power and authority has been studied extensively in influence researches, especially when 
compliance is coerced and voluntary choices may not be granted (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). As a 
result, it is sensible to test instrumental (i.e. advice and support), expressive (i.e. friendship and 
affiliation), and power (i.e. influence) networks for their effects on the formation of ISC. 
2.3 The mediators of information security climate and compliant intention 
To increase our model’s practical values, we added intention to comply with security policies as the 
outcome of the networks’ features and ISC. These effects have been supported with empirical results 
of prior researches. For example, ISC dimensions (e.g. supervisor and peers’ behaviour) were found to 
increase compliant intention (Goo et al. 2014) and actual compliance (Jaafar and Ajis 2013). Likewise, 
Sykes et al. (2009) extended Technology Acceptance Model and found networks’ indices influence 
intention to adopt new information system. In addition, we argue that there would be variables in 
between that mediate those direct relationships. 
First, data about the different types of social networks only informs the ties possessed by individuals 
that provide the resources for achieving certain goals. These ties serve as the facilitating conditions 
that affect individual’s perceptions, such as the more knowledge sources one has, the more confident 
they would feel in coping with difficult tasks and adopting new technology (Sykes et al. 2009). In this 
example, such confidence could mediate the number of possessed ties and adoption intention. Second, 
ISC reflects the employees’ perceptions of the expected security practices and policies, which in turn 
infer the priority of information security in the workplace. This perceived priority and its effect on 
performance have been confirmed in safety climate researches. For instance, the safety climate 
models of Neal et al. (2000) and Zohar (2013) describe “safety motivation” as reflecting safety’s 
priority while being the mediator of safety climate and behaviour. Regarding ISC, only the model of 
Chan et al. (2005) reflects those mediated relationships. It is also worth noticing that both Jaafar and 
Ajis (2013) and Goo et al. (2014) found weak (b = 0.121) and unsupported hypotheses when testing 
the direct impact of ISC on compliant intention and actual compliance. In contrast, the effect of Chan 
et al.'s (2005) “ISC perceptions” construct as a mediator on compliant intention was stronger (b = 
0.237). Such difference hints that adding mediators between ISC and the outcome variables could be a 
better solution. 
We found the factors of Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to be the most relevant for serving as the 
mediators in our conceptual model. TPB hypothesised that behavioural intention is motivated by 
attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen 1985). While TPB is widely known 
in social science researches, it is important to discuss the current arguments about the construct 
“Perceived behavioural control”. Even though Ajzen (2011, p. 446) noted that perceived behavioural 
control is “very similar to Bandura’s conception of self-efficacy”, empirical evidences consistently 
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showed that this factor would be more accurately conceptualised as a higher-order construct that 
reflects self-efficacy and perceived controllability (Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2005; Trafimow et al. 
2002). We follow this suggestion as it adds richer explanations to the model. In particular, we argue 
that the perceived priority of information security (inferred by ISC and social interactions) would be 
described by the attitude about security’s importance, as well as the belief that performing security 
practices is their own responsibility and control. 
3 Conceptual model development 
3.1 TPB and ISC hypotheses 
TPB hypothesises that behavioural intention is motivated by three factors, including attitude, 
subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control (Ajzen 2011). This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Information security attitude positively affects Compliant intention 
H2: Subjective norm positively affects Compliant intention 
H3: Perceived behavioural control positively affects Compliant intention 
Positive attitude about the priority of information security could be affected by ISC, as employees 
observe the espoused values being consistently enacted by their immediate colleagues and 
supervisors. Zohar (2013) explained based on expectancy theory’s tenet that when safety is 
interpreted as a priority in the workplace, it invokes positive attitudes that make the employees adjust 
their behaviour while expecting rewards from doing so. Likewise, Neal et al. (2000) cited performance 
theory which posits that attitude about safety’s priority mediates the relationship between 
organisational climate and safety performance. 
Perceived behavioural control describes the confidence in completing tasks (i.e. self-efficacy) and the 
belief in having control over the target behaviour (i.e. perceived controllability). While prior ISC 
researches have not investigated the relationship between climate and self-efficacy, there were 
empirical results supported the link between safety climate and knowledge (Neal et al. 2000; Zohar 
2013). Zohar (2013) reasoned that safety knowledge and skills become more desirable due to the 
prioritisation of safety climate and urge the employees to invest more effort in acquiring those skills. 
It is then reasonable to propose that employees who spent effort in enhancing information security 
knowledge and skills (by perceiving ISC) would feel confident in performing security behaviour.  
Moreover, employees working in an environment where co-workers and supervisors actively follow 
the policy and take ownership of information security would be pressured by the norms and refrain 
from delegating responsibility to the others. The continuous observation of ISC would make one 
realise their ownership over information security tasks, as well as the subjective norm in relation to 
performing security practices. This argument has been confirmed by prior studies such as Liang et al. 
(2010) who found significant effect of team climate on subjective norm. As a consequence, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H4: ISC positively affects Information security attitude 
H5: ISC positively affects Subjective norm 
H6: ISC positively affects Perceived behavioural control 
3.2 Network hypotheses 
Our last set of hypotheses concerns the effects of social networks’ features towards on ISC and TPB’s 
factors. The formation of organisational climates and ISC was argued to result from the social 
interactions that facilitate sense-making (Ashforth 1985; Dang-Pham et al. 2015). Zohar and Tenne-
Gazit (2008) found densities of communication and friendship networks significantly enhanced 
climate strength, which in turn supported symbolic interaction as an antecedent of safety climate. 
Possession of ties could also motivate individuals by providing resources and influences. As previously 
argued, one would perceive higher self-efficacy and control over security behaviour as they gain more 
knowledge about it. Individuals who have access to knowledge sources in the organisational networks 
would have more learning opportunities and perceive higher self-efficacy. That individual’s possession 
of ties to knowledge sources can be measured as network centrality, which Dong and Yang (2009) 
demonstrated that structural capital centrality improved self-efficacy. 
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Attitude and realisation of norm could also be affected by informational and normative influences that 
are both subject to the flows of information and influence exchanged amongst network actors. 
Hossain and de Silva (2009) found individual’s possession of ties affect attitude about technology 
adoption. Similarly, it was confirmed (Chow and Chan 2008) and theorised (ten Kate et al. 2010) that 
individuals having access to more extensive networks tend to have enhanced perception of subjective 
norm. Network theory also postulates that two individuals sharing similar beliefs and perceptions are 
due to diffusion (i.e. interacting with direct contacts) or structural equivalence (i.e. being connected 
with the same third person but not necessarily with each other) (Borgatti et al. 2013). Based on these 
arguments, it is logical to hypothesise that centrality and equivalence indices positively impact 
security attitude and subjective norm. The network hypotheses are proposed below and illustrated 
with the other hypotheses in Figure 1: 
H7: Centrality & equivalence indices positively affect Information security attitude 
H8: Centrality & equivalence indices positively affect Subjective norm 
H9: Centrality & equivalence indices positively affect Perceived behavioural control 
H10: Centrality & equivalence indices positively affect ISC 
 
Figure 1: Proposed conceptual model and constructs’ dimensionality 
4 An exploratory study in Vietnam 
4.1 Rationale & context for the descriptive case study 
The conceptual model in Figure 1 specifies the constructs’ dimensions whose measurements can be 
found from prior researches and used to develop instruments for data collection. The hypotheses can 
be tested quantitatively with regression analysis techniques. However, the social networks were added 
to the model based on theoretical suggestions as per our literature review. In addition, the adoption of 
social network analysis is uncommon in information security behavioural area which makes it 
challenging to select the meaningful ties from a plethora of organisational interactions (Dang-Pham et 
al. 2014). Dang-Pham et al. (2015) suggested that it is foremost necessary for network studies to 
identify the ties that are relevant to information security context. To refine our model, we conducted 
an exploratory, descriptive case study in Vietnam. The objectives of the case study include (1) 
identifying the relevant network ties and (2) validating the dimensions of ISC. 
According to Yin (2003, p. 13), a case study is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident”. A descriptive case study specifically aims to present objectively the 
research phenomena rather than interpreting causations (Dubé and Paré 2003; Gerring 2004). 
Moreover, descriptive case studies are most effective for investigating areas that are under-researched 
(Laws and McLeod 2006). The concepts of social networks in people-centric security workplaces are 
complex and relatively new (Dang-Pham et al. 2014; Gartner 2015), thus case studies are necessary for 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Dang-Pham, Pittayachawan, and Bruno 
2015, University of South Australia, Adelaide  People-centric security climate: model and exploratory study  
 
 
 
keeping academic researches in pace with industry practices (Dubé and Paré 2003). Moreover, there 
is an emerging need for security research in non-Western contexts (Crossler et al. 2013). Provided our 
exploratory goal, the descriptive case study conducted in Vietnam as a South East Asian country is 
justified. 
Context: since Vietnam is rapidly transforming into a global IT sourcing hub, local companies are 
pressured by business partners to enhance their information security management systems (ISMS). 
The Vietnamese ICT white book in 2014 reported that only 30 per cent of the local companies have 
implemented security policies and controls. In addition, 39 firms had their ISMSs certified for the 
international security standard ISO 27001 in 2013 (ISO 2015). For our research, we interviewed six 
security professionals who were project managers of six different ISO 27001’s implementation 
projects (Table 1). All participants were working in companies in Ho Chi Minh City which is one of the 
most urban cities in Vietnam. This sample selection’s strategy is to ensure that the interviewees have 
the expertise and knowledge to provide informed insights. 
 Occupation InfoSec experience Industry 
P1 InfoSec Consultant/Auditor 3 years Banking 
P2 IT Manager 14 years IT services 
P3 InfoSec Consultant 5 years Banking 
P4 Information Security Officer 7 years IT services 
P5 Deputy IT Director 10 years Banking 
P6 Data Security Manager 3.5 years Engineering and electronics 
Table 1: Interviewees' profiles 
4.2 Addressing case study’s research rigour 
Design: Dubé and Paré (2003) recommended case study researchers to ensure research rigour by 
being transparent in design, data collection and analysis, and reporting results. Our design follows 
Gerring's (2004) structure of a descriptive case study which consists of case(s) that belong to a 
research unit. Under this structure, the network ties and dimensions of ISC in the people-centric 
security workplaces in Vietnam constitute a research unit. This unit comprises of interviews with six 
professionals that serve as cases.   
Data collection: we initiated data collection process by sending interview invitations to the 
researchers’ known contacts, online forums, and social media platforms such as LinkedIn for one 
month. We received seven acceptances to participate in the interview in the beginning, but one 
professional pulled out from the project after consulting with their management. As a result, six semi-
structured interviews were conducted in-person in Vietnamese and audio-recorded, which each lasts 
one hour on average. 
Data analysis: interviewed data was analysed by using NVivo 10 to perform thematic coding with 
social interactions, co-workers and supervisor’s practices as major themes. Matching patterns 
emerged as we performed within- and cross-cases analyses (Yin 2009), which reinforce internal 
validity (Dubé and Paré 2003). External validity was achieved by having the participants reviewed and 
provided feedback about the analysed results, and we reported direct quotes in our coming 
discussions to ensure rigour (Dubé and Paré 2003; Riege 2003). 
Protocol: presenting the case study protocol further enhances research rigour (Dubé and Paré 2003). 
Our protocol begins with performing a literature review to develop a descriptive theory that guides the 
case study and support its findings (Riege 2003; Zaidah 2007). Our descriptive theory is the first part 
of the conceptual model depicted in Figure 1, which consists of the network ties that were 
hypothesised to affect ISC and its dimensions. The case study protocol summarises our research 
process as illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Case study protocol 
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5 Findings and discussion 
5.1 Informational networks 
Our interviews asked about the environmental features that promote the priority of information 
security and autonomous compliance, as reflecting a people-centric security workplace. The priority of 
security can be explained by having the employees attend security training or read security guidelines. 
They may also have the impression that security is prioritised from observing the workplace’s ISC and 
perceiving the social pressures from co-workers and supervisor’s practices. In other words, the ISC 
features emit informational and normative influences or networks that give rise to the priority of 
security. 
Information about the importance of organisational security can be exchanged via the employees’ 
interactions with security training programs and communications. In particular, the interviewed 
participants suggested conveying information about the relevant security threats and benefits of 
compliance to educate the users on the priority of security. However, explaining the benefits of 
compliance was considered a tricky task. Some participants argued that only the organisation could 
recognise the benefits of its employees’ compliance. In contrast, employees could see the immediate 
consequences (e.g. data loss, sanction) more easily than at organisational level (e.g. reputation & 
financial losses). A recommended solution was to explain the benefits of compliance as mutual:  
“When organisations tell the users that there’ll be security threats that cause 
reputation and financial losses if they don’t comply, they would think: ‘Who cares, in 
the worst scenario I’ll just quit the company.’” (P2) 
“Your regular trainings must emphasise that if the company can demonstrate 
excellent information security through consistent compliance, we will gain trust from 
the clients and they would give us more large projects… and there could be pay raise 
from that too.” (P4) 
Alternatively, management can employ security communications such as posters, flyers, screen savers, 
announcements and reminder emails to promote the priority of security. These communications often 
include information about security threats that are relevant and realistic. While these 
communications are not guaranteed to change the users’ security behaviours, their continuous 
deployment is cost-effective and may be effective in long term by overloading the users with 
information. 
Besides learning about security’s importance from security training and communications, the 
participants discussed that it would be most effective to have the employees interact and exchange 
information with their direct supervisors. Unlike generic security training and communications, direct 
supervisors know best the daily operations of their work units and can educate their subordinates on 
how to align security tasks with other work priorities. Moreover, they can persuade the subordinates 
more easily due to their closer ties in the workplace. The role of direct supervisors in promoting the 
priority of security is especially vital in large and hierarchical organisations: 
“If the firm is too large then the direct supervisors are responsible for hosting 
security talks with their subordinates. For example, they can share with their work 
unit the security issues that have occurred every month, and explain how those 
issues can affect the unit’s KPI and everyone’s job.” (P3) 
“The end users would firstly observe how their department heads behave and think; 
if those leaders are well aware of the priority of information security then they will 
perform the secure behaviour, and in that case their subordinates wouldn’t want to 
do differently.” (P6) 
However, the participants also warned about the issue of autonomous departments that allow security 
compromises or workarounds. As a result, they discussed necessary traits that direct supervisors 
should possess to effectively promote the priority of security: 
“To be a security leader, the direct supervisor should have leadership, 
communication skills, and the ability to lead by example besides having sound 
security expertise. They should be able to realise the security risks and understand 
their impacts on the business.” (P2) 
“Direct supervisors need to understand clearly the security expectations of the top 
management. They also need to be able to motivate and inspire their subordinates to 
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perform security behaviours, either by helping them to understand security in a 
friendly manner or simply by contiuously demonstrating their compliance.” (P4) 
5.2 Normative networks 
Normative networks pressure the employees to realise the priority of security without necessarily 
understanding the benefits of compliance. Audit and monitoring, as well as security policies and 
sanctions were mentioned as the workplace’s features that produce such pressures. While the 
participants acknowledged the importance of announcing the levels of sanctions in security policies, 
they did not suggest using sanctions to motivate compliance. The participants explained that 
sanctions could be perceived by the employees, especially the white-collar office workers, as a threat 
and would react against it. Moreover, participant P3 described sanctions as a reactive approach to 
manage organisational security, since effective ISMS should prevent the violations from happening 
rather than punishing them. The participants recommended conducting periodic and transparent 
audits and monitoring instead of using sanctions to deter violations and encourage compliance. 
Performing regular audits was described as enabling the organisation to recognise compliant efforts 
and detect potential violations to issue warnings. More important, these auditing efforts help to 
continuously remind the employees about their responsibility in ensuring organisational security and 
that they are accountable for such task. 
Another normative source with which the employees can interact is their co-workers in the same work 
units. The participants discussed that the employees could interpret the priority of security in the 
workplace by observing their colleagues’ behaviours such as voluntarily taking security considerations 
while performing daily work or displaying concerns about being held accountable for security 
consequences. In addition, the effects of socialisation and social exclusion could be observed from the 
interviews: 
“Even a person with high security awareness would eventually change when they join 
a firm where no one cares about security–all being carefree and having no rules to 
follow… For example, the co-workers would point at the person and ask: ‘why would 
you spend your valuable time worrying about these security things?’” (P1) 
Although the participants confirmed the high collectivism of Vietnamese culture in the workplace, 
they discussed that exploiting such cultural trait to disseminate security perceptions without 
purposeful interventions may be ineffective. For instance, E3 suggested that the effects of rewards and 
sanctions would be recognised easily by the employees in Vietnamese workplaces thanks to the 
widespread word-of-mouth network. However, the other participants did not find interpersonal 
influences caused by co-workers desirable: 
“Social influence is about persuading someone to like something and do it. The 
employees may like a person and follow him or her, but security is also about being 
enforced to follow the policies. Only the managers with formal authorities have the 
power to enforce but not anyone.” (P2) 
“They could observe their colleagues perform security behaviours, and even though 
they know the good intention behind that, they won’t necessarily follow because they 
don’t feel like doing those behaviours… unless they see some benefits in doing so, but 
I don’t think they would see any since performing security behaviours is not a 
competition after all.” (P6) 
6 Discussion & future directions 
6.1 Organisational networks and information security climate 
The exploratory findings validated and refined the proposed conceptual model (Figure 1). Our 
interviews found both informational and normative networks play important roles in promoting the 
priority of security. Informational networks describe information exchange between the employees 
and their direct supervisor and co-workers, as well as training sessions and security communications. 
In addition, periodic audit & monitoring, security policies, and co-workers were recognised as 
normative sources of the pressure that makes the employees believe in the priority of security. Affect 
(i.e. friendship) and power networks can be found in the exchange of such pressure between those 
normative sources and each individual. Furthermore, the findings suggested that non-human entities 
in the workplace (e.g. training session, policies, audit & monitoring) can be included in social network 
analysis as network actors besides co-workers and supervisor. 
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6.2 Dimensions of information security climate 
The construct of ISC in Figure 1 was conceptualised to reflect observed co-workers and direct 
supervisor’s security practices, based on prior literatures about ISC (Chan et al. 2005; Dang-Pham et 
al. 2015; Goo et al. 2014; Jaafar and Ajis 2013) and safety climate (Zohar 2013). The case study’s 
findings confirmed and also extended this conceptualisation. Specifically, ISC components may also 
include training sessions, audit & monitoring, security policies, and security communications. These 
components fit the definition of ISC which covers the observable workplace’s characteristics that 
promote the priority of security. Nevertheless, including them as dimensions of ISC would result in 
broader coverage of the construct at the expense of increasing the research instruments’ length. In 
other words, more questions about ISC would need to be added to quantitative survey or qualitative 
interviews, which burden the participants. As a result, future studies that come up with a validated 
instrument for measuring ISC would be desired. 
6.3 Implementation tactics to develop a people-centric security climate 
People-centric security workplace consists of employees who are aware of the security’s priority and 
their responsibility in performing security tasks (Gartner 2015). Such perceptions are represented by 
the construct ISC, and the interactionist perspective explains that descriptive meanings such as ISC 
emerge as employees interact with the information sources and interpret them (Ashforth 1985; James 
et al. 2008). The case study demonstrates both sense-making and sense-giving processes that give rise 
to ISC in the real context. Organisations then employ sense-giving tactics which exploit rituals and 
mentors or advisors to communicate the desired messages (Ashforth 1985). Security training 
programs and periodic audits, as well as the use of formal leaders that display the priority of security 
via leading by example, are illustrations of such tactics. As a consequence, the case study’s findings 
could serve as practical recommendations for organisations to develop their people-centric security 
workplaces. 
6.4 Compliance meaningfulness as an interpretation of workplace’s security 
The construct ISC in our research only reflects the descriptive meanings of co-workers and 
supervisor’s practices that reflect the priority of security. Besides such descriptive meanings, 
psychological climate literatures suggested there exist subjective meanings that vary amongst 
individuals (James et al. 2008). One type of those subjective meanings is “work meaningfulness”, 
which refers to the significance attached to one’s work that is evaluated as important and meaningful 
(Rosso et al. 2010). According to these researchers, work meaningfulness has been found to affect 
important individual’s outcomes such as commitment, engagement, behaviour, and performance. This 
construct could be conceptualised in security context as the meaningfulness of compliance, or how the 
employees perceive their compliance could play an important role and contribute to a more secure 
workplace. On the one hand, compliance meaningfulness is different from the descriptive meanings of 
ISC in that it reflects the characteristics of security tasks as perceived subjectively by individuals. On 
the other hand, they are relevant to each other and to the definition of people-centric security 
workplace as both constructs describe the employees’ perceptions of the expected security practices 
and priority of security. 
The participants in our case study emphasised on explaining the mutual benefits and consequences of 
compliance and violations to justify the meaningfulness of security. Investigating the meaningfulness 
of security is also aligned with the recent transition of security behavioural researches towards the 
persuasive approach to motivate compliance. For example, Karjalainen and Siponen (2011) proposed 
the experiential training approach that educates users on the need for security protection and 
convinces their voluntary compliance. We believe investigating compliance meaningfulness along with 
ISC could contribute to the whole picture of meanings in information security context and the 
persuasive approach in particular. 
7 Conclusion 
It can be observed that people-centric security workplace was most recently discussed as an industry 
trend (Gartner 2015) and security behavioural researches are moving towards the persuasive 
approach (Karjalainen and Siponen 2011). These two directions are aligned with each other by both 
aiming to develop an organisational environment where employees understand the priority of security 
and perform security behaviours proactively. 
We examined the fundamental challenge that not every employee can have access to and recognise the 
security cues that are implemented by the organisation. Moreover, a workplace consists of security 
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features whose meanings can be interpreted differently by the employees, and so is the priority of 
security. We adopted the theoretical lens of symbolic interactionism to investigate the formation of 
information security climate, which is defined as the descriptive meanings of the security features. 
Information security climate reflects the perceptions of security policies and practices that 
subsequently infer the priority of security. 
In this multi-stage research, we forwarded a conceptual model which describes the formation of 
information security climate as a result of the employees’ interactions with the organisation’s social 
networks. The model’s hypotheses were grounded on established theories and empirical findings of 
prior studies, and they can be tested with regression techniques and social network analysis. In the 
second stage, we conducted a descriptive case study with six information security professionals in 
Vietnam to refine the constructs of our proposed model. The limitations of this second stage include 
the small sample size of the descriptive case study as well as its scope which limited to Vietnam. 
The exploratory findings confirmed co-workers and supervisor’s practices as important dimensions of 
information security climate. Furthermore, they provided additional dimensions that include security 
training, policies, audit & monitoring, and security communications. These findings also suggested 
recommendations for developing people-centric security workplaces, especially in contexts that are 
similar to Vietnam as a developing country in South East Asia. More important, informational and 
normative networks were identified from the case study, which supported their inclusion in our 
conceptual model. Finally, by considering the effects of social networks in the model, we suggested the 
adoption of social network analysis as a novel technique to investigate security behaviours. 
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